




Do Managers Manipulate Earnings Prior to Management Buyouts?
Mao, Y.; Renneboog, L.D.R.
Publication date:
2013
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Mao, Y., & Renneboog, L. D. R. (2013). Do Managers Manipulate Earnings Prior to Management Buyouts?
(CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-055). Finance.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





















































Do Managers Manipulate Earnings 
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Yaping Mao and Luc Renneboog1 
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Abstract  
To address the question as to whether managers manipul te accounting numbers downwards prior to 
management buyouts (MBOs), we implement an industry-adjusted buyout-specific approach and receive an 
affirmative answer. In UK buyout companies, negative earnings manipulation (understating the earnings prior to 
the deal) often occurs, both by means of accrual management and real earnings management. We demonstrate 
that MBOs are significantly more frequently subject to negative manipulation than leveraged buyouts (LBOs). 
In non-buyout firms, positive earnings management frequently occurs because it affects managers’ bonuses and 
the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ expectations which may trigger a positive market reaction. By 
means of an instrumental variables approach, we examine competing incentives affecting the degree and size of 
earnings manipulation. Our evidence implies that the (ex ante) perceived likelihood that an MBO will be
undertaken has a strong significant effect on negative earnings management, while the external borrowing 
capacity of the buyout company is not determined by standard capital structure factors, such as earnings 
numbers. The implementation of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code of 2003 has somewhat reduced 
the degree of both accrual earnings and real management in MBOs, but since then other manipulation 
techniques (related to production costs and asset revaluations) are more frequently used, which may be induced 
by the fact that these manipulation methods are more difficult to detect. 
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Prior to management buyouts (MBOs), managers have an incentive to deflate the reported 
earnings numbers by accounting manipulation in the hope of lowering the subsequent stock 
price. If they succeed, they will be able to acquire (a large part of) the company on the cheap. 
It is important to note that accounting manipulation n a buyout transaction may have severe 
consequences for the shareholders who sell out in the transaction: if the earnings distortion is 
reflected in the stock price, the stock price decline cannot be undone and the wealth loss of 
shareholders is irreversible if the company goes private subsequent to the buyout. Mispriced 
stock and false financial statements are still issue  frequently mentioned when MBO 
transactions are evaluated. The UK’s Financial Servic s Authority (FSA, 2006) ranks market 
abuse as one of the highest risks and suggests moreintensive supervision of leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs). The concerns about mispriced buyouts are therefore a motive to test 
empirically whether earnings numbers are manipulated pr ceding buyout transactions. 
 
Whereas the manipulation of financial statements prior to US MBOs has occasionally been 
detected in the academic literature over the past 20 years, we wonder whether accounting 
manipulation has occurred/still occurs in the second most important buyout market, namely 
that of the UK which is subject to different regulation and enforcement. We focus on the 
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period since the start of the second LBO wave: 1997-onwards, which also coincides with the 
tightened corporate governance regulation (Guo et al., 2011) and enhanced reporting integrity 
(Botsari and Meeks, 2008). We investigate two types of incentives for accounting 
manipulation in an LBO/MBO context. On one hand, managers may opt to present lower 
earnings if they are likely to participate in a prospective buyout transaction and will 
subsequently stay with the company. Negative earnings manipulation or earnings 
understatement is induced by the management engagement incentives. On the other hand, 
managers’ incentive to misrepresent the earnings may be related to the financing of the future 
transaction. A typical LBO is traditionally financed with 60 to 90 percent debt (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009) – although this ratio has decreased to 50-60 percent since the recent 
financial crises. Low earnings (cash flow) numbers would reduce the amount of debt that a 
firm could bear at the relevering stage. Thus, managers who prepare a corporate sale by 
means of an LBO could manipulate earnings upwards in order to facilitate the buyout 
transaction – this is the xternal financing incentive. We distinguish here between MBOs 
whereby the pre-transaction management remains (financ ally) involved in the company 
subsequent to the transaction, and LBOs which we define as transactions without subsequent 
involvement of the incumbent management.  
 
We not only concentrate on whether and why manipulation occurs but also on how earnings 
manipulation can occur by considering accrual management and real earnings management 
preceding the buyouts. Whereas accrual-based earnings management activities have no cash 
flow consequences, real earnings management refers to managerial activities which deviate 
from normal business practices and affect cash flows. We advance an industry-adjusted 
buyout-specific approach to capture the abnormal accounting numbers which proxy for 
accounting manipulation. In this context, we also study asset revaluations and transfers across 
reserve accounts on the balance sheet as a means of external financing manipulation.  
 
The contributions to the literature are the following: First, there is little evidence on earnings 
manipulation outside the US buyout market, which raises the question as to whether 
dishonest accounting management is a phenomenon that ot er markets also suffer from? 
Moreover, most studies have examined a sample belonging to the first MBO wave of the 
1980s. Since then, the corporate governance regulation has been tightened (Guo et al, 2011), 
and accounting standards became stricter in terms of transparency. For instance, in 2003, the 
revised Combined Code on Corporate Governance (currently called: the UK Corporate 
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Governance Code) was implemented to improve financial reporting quality which raises the 
question whether or not accounting management is still that pronounced? Second, earnings 
manipulation comprising accrual management and real earnings management are analyzed in 
the context of buyout transactions, but the management may also resort to (tangible) asset 
manipulation (asset revaluations and transfers between reserve accounts). We thus investigate 
multiple manipulation techniques. Third, while raw bnormal accruals are usually calculated 
in the earnings management literature, they still comprise accruals influenced by specific 
corporate events and are different across different industries. Therefore, we adjust the raw 
abnormal accruals for the mean abnormal accruals of non-buyout firms of the same 
size-group, industry and ex ante performance. In addition to the traditional approach of 
contrasting buyout firms with a control group of non-buyout peers matched by firm 
characteristics, we contrast MBOs to LBOs as both types of buyouts induce different 
incentives for earnings manipulation. We hence compare the adjusted abnormal accounting 
figures of MBOs and LBOs. In so doing, we provide a test of accounting manipulation 
directly attributable to manager engagement incentiv s around the buyout event. Fourth, we 
analyze the underlying incentives for accounting manipulation and address the endogeneity 
issue of using the (ex-post) buyout type as a proxy f r management engagement incentives by 
means of a two-staged IV approach. In the first stage, we model the decision to undertake an 
MBO or LBO using firm characteristics in the year proceeding the accounting manipulation 
year. In the second stage, we use the predicted MBO as a proxy for the management 
engagement incentive. We show that the causality is more likely to flow from the 
management engagement decision to the accounting maipul tion decision.  
 
We report the following findings: First, downward earnings management, both in terms of 
accrual and real earnings management, has been widely used in the UK since the start of the 
second buyout wave. Our industry-adjusted approach shows that the abnormal accrual figures 
are significantly more negative than those of non-buyout firms of the same industry and with 
similar size and ex ante performance. For buyout companies, the accruals decline in the 
manipulation year (the year prior to the deal annoucement) whereas non-buyout companies 
are generally subject to positive accrual management as positive manipulation can affect 
managers’ bonuses and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ expectations which may 
trigger a positive market reaction. Second, in MBOs, there is evidence of more real earnings 
manipulation (through production costs and sales revenues) than in LBOs. The external 
financing incentive – upward earnings manipulation increases the relevering potential in a 
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buyout transaction – is not supported by our analysis. This may be explained by the fact that 
during the second LBO wave it was easier to attract external funds, considering the growth in 
the high yield bond market (by more than 600% since 1997). Credit market conditions rather 
than company characteristics may determine the financi g capacity. Third, besides income 
statement manipulation, we show that managers are mo likely to revaluate assets upwards, 
the magnitude and frequency is small. The evidence on asset reserves revaluation is 
consistent with insignificance of the external financing incentive. Fourth, the revised 
Corporate Governance Code of 2003 has had a significa t impact on both accrual and real 
earnings manipulation. Accrual management did indeed decline since 2003. In contrast, the 
other manipulation techniques (regarding production c sts and asset revaluations) are more 
frequently used since the tightening of the corporate governance regulation, which may be 
induced by the fact that these manipulation methods are more difficult to detect. This finding 
is consistent with some recent US evidence: after th  adoption of SOX, companies shifted 
from accrual management to real earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008). However, in 
MBOs, both accrual and real earnings manipulations are reduced after 2003. Overall, our 
findings imply that more stringent accounting rules have been effective to curb dishonest 
earnings management in management buyout transactions. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature and develop 
the hypotheses. Section 3 describes how accounting management is measured and explains 
the empirical setup. Section 4 reports the sample sel ction criteria and discusses the 
descriptive statistics. The empirical results and robustness analyses are set out in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature overview and hypotheses 
The US literature on accounting manipulation states that downward earnings management 
prior to MBOs is expected. In addition to income statement manipulation, we also examine 
balance sheet manipulation, more specifically: asset reserves revaluation (reflected by 
revaluations of tangible assets, the recording of increments (or decrements) in the equity 
account, and changes to the debt-to-equity ratio) preceding the buyouts. The reason for this 
dual approach is that, as Dechow et al. (2010) suggest, managers can make a variety of 
accounting choices which are inspired by different (misrepresentation) objectives.  
 
2.1. Accounting manipulation 
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2.1.1 Earnings manipulation 
In the context of the surging MBO activity of the 1980s in the US, virtually every buyout 
proposal was contested by shareholders claiming that they were cheated (Longstreth, 1984). 
Even through recommendations by investment banks and approval by independent directors 
were sought to evaluate the fairness of buyout transactions, doubts about accounting 
manipulation remained. DeAngelo (1986) did not detect accrual manipulation preceding US 
MBOs, but Perry and Williams (1994) who worked with a larger sample and utilized a 
regression-based model to capture discretionary accru ls more accurately, did document 
downward accrual management. Wu (1997) showed that on average, earnings manipulation 
prior to MBOs decreased the acquisition price by 18.6%. While managers may have good 
personal reasons to manipulate earnings downwards, they also have incentives to manipulate 
earnings upwards. Fisher and Louis (2008) stated that managers overstated their earnings to 
get favorable debt contract terms at the buyout, bu for US MBOs, downward accrual 
management dominated. Ang et al. (2010) confirm that managers tend to manipulate earnings 
downwards if they continue to have a strong equity tie with the targets after the buyouts. 
 
Managers have stronger incentives to understate the arnings numbers in MBOs relative to 
LBOs. We hereby define an MBO as a leveraged buyout transaction whereby at least one of 
the pre-buyout managers financially participates in the transaction and stays in the company 
subsequent to the buyout. According to our LBO definition, the incumbent management 
(prior to the LBO) will no longer be involved with the company subsequent to the 
transaction. 
 
From an ownership perspective, managers are (co-)acquirers of MBO targets such that 
earnings manipulation resulting in a lower purchase price leads to self-dealing. In order to 
win the support of the management, financial sponsors in pursuit of target companies usually 
send a “love letter” which comprises an invitation t  the current management team for further 
discussion and the intention to employ them after sealing the deal (Das and Chon, 2011). So, 
managers intending to stay in the firm have incentiv s to facilitate the transaction (although 
the management’s personal benefits in MBOs will largely exceed those in LBOs). Frequently, 
a ratchet is offered to the management which increases their post-transaction ownership stake 
in order to motivate them to achieve strong periodic performance and good exit returns2 
                                                             
 
2 A ratchet is an incentive mechanism which either offers managers a modest equity stake if managers meet 
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(Renneboog et al., 2007; Yates and Hinchliffe, 2010). Based on the above arguments, we 
postulate the managerial engagement hypothesis: Prior to MBOs, earnings are manipulated 
downwards by both accrual management and real earnings management. Moreover, earnings 
are manipulated downwards to a larger extent in MBOs than in LBOs (H1). 
 
The implicit assumption underlying this hypothesis is that market participants cannot 
differentiate between earnings arising from business activities and manipulated earnings. In 
general, Bradshaw et al. (2001) find that even sophi ticated investors, such as auditors and 
financial analysts, fail to detect accrual anomaly. Likewise, Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2007) 
show that bond investors do not correctly price accruals. Hence, the possibility of detecting 
manipulation seems rather low. Moreover, if manipulation is found out, managers could more 
easily justify downward manipulation than upward manipulation by referring to the principle 
of accounting conservatism.  
 
Buyout transactions largely rely on external financing, a combination of senior loans, 
subordinated loans, and high-yield bonds. Ample evid nce points out that the debt financier 
is prone to use earnings numbers to predict future cash flows and make credit decisions 
(Palepu et al., 2000). In a buyout setting, Fischer and Louis (2008) find that managers who 
need large external funds to finance an MBO are more likely to report less negative abnormal 
accruals, although this effect is tempered when fixed assets serve as collateral. Hence, the 
external financing incentive can be formulated as: Earnings management is negatively related 
to the amount of external financing needed in a buyout. The relation is mitigated when the 
buyout company has more fixed assets that can serve as collateral (H2). 
 
Alternatively, Axelson et al. (2013) contend that managers issue more debts when the credit 
market is overvalued. Therefore, a high bond market spread, as a proxy for credit market 
conditions, is a better predictor of buyout leverag than the earnings numbers. Shivdasani and 
Wang (2011) confirm that the boom in buyout transactions from 2004 to 2007 was fueled by 
the fast growth in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
 
2.1.2. Asset revaluation manipulation 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
ex-ante specified performance targets after buyouts (Renneboog et al., 2007) and/or entitles managers to receive 
a higher proportion of the exit proceeds if an exit is achieved beyond a particular ‘hurdle’ return rate for 
investors (Yates and Hinchliffe, 2010). 
8 
 
Whereas the literature on accounting manipulation prior to MBOs traditionally concentrates 
on earnings management (income statement manipulation) because earnings reflect current 
performance and are used in valuation exercises, balance sheet manipulation through ‘asset 
revaluation’ may also occur. This can also enable a target company to attract more debt to 
finance the deal. While earnings management is used to influence the stock price, asset 
revaluation manipulation is mainly used to affect the level of external borrowing. 
 
Asset revaluation may be used more often in the UK than in the US: since the implementation 
of FRS3 in 1993, companies are encouraged to revalu fixed assets3 on the ground that they 
provide useful and value relevant information4. The difference between an asset’s old 
carrying value and its revaluation is credited to a revaluation reserve account on the balance 
sheet. The depreciation charges are subsequently calculated based on the revalued assets. 
Moreover, the gains or losses on the sale of previously revaluated assets are calculated 
referring to the new revaluation value instead of historical cost. Hence, the new asset 
revaluation practice has the following implications: (i) If assets are upwards (downwards) 
revalued, it increases (decreases) the equity amount via the revaluation reserve account on the 
balance sheet and thus lowers (boosts) the debt-to-equity ratio; (ii) If assets are revalued 
upwards, there is no contemporaneous effect on the income statement, but it will lower gains 
from a future asset disposal as the inflated carrying value will serve as the benchmark value. 
Meanwhile, the upward revaluation increases the future depreciation charges. If assets are 
revalued downwards, the net revaluation decrement is expensed on the current income 
statement.  
 
To sum up, revaluations affect the current debt-to-equity ratio on the balance sheet, the future 
depreciation on the income statement, and the future gains from asset sales on the income 
statement. Revaluations are discretionary in nature, because managers can decide whether, 
when, and what amounts of assets are revalued in financ al statements (Lin and Peasnell, 
2000). 
 
                                                             
 
3 Intangible asset revaluation is also permitted, but UK companies hardly use it (Aboody et al., 1999). 
4 Since the EU’s adoption of IFRS in 2005, under IAS 16, companies can choose between: (i) the historical cost 
model; (2) the revaluation model. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed that all US 
firms are required to issue financial statements in accordance with IFRS by 2014. Under IFRS, firms are
allowed to choose either the cost model or the revaluation model to measure the value of fixed assets (SEC for 
Immediate Release 2008-184). 
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At first glance, in a highly leveraged buyout, managers have an incentive to revalue assets 
upwards in order to be able to show a lower leverag r tio which enables them to attract the 
required amount of debt financing at favorable borrowing terms. Easton et al.’s (1993) survey 
shows that a key motivation to revalue assets is indeed such debt contract considerations. 
However, these current gains from upward assets revaluation induce a cost, namely the 
reduction of a buyout target’s future gains. First, the accumulated assets revaluation reserves 
exhaust companies’ possibilities to further use this manipulation tool subsequent to the 
buyout as the amount of upward revaluation is not unlimited. Second, upward manipulation 
increases depreciation and decreases net income in th near future. Moreover, as Wright et al. 
(2001) report, buyout targets often restructure by divesting non-core businesses to remove 
downside inefficiency. The inflated assets will lower the gains from future asset sales, which 
will also exert a negative impact on earnings. The resulting lower earnings will directly 
influence managers’ bonuses and ratchets. It is also noteworthy that upward revaluation is 
also costly, as valuation fees are paid to independent valuators to certify the revaluation. 
Therefore, a manager has to weigh the costs of future gains against the current benefits. 
However, in LBOs (as we define them), managers willnot be involved subsequent to the 
buyout and will hence not bear the future cost of upward revaluation. Therefore, we expect 
that: assets are revalued upwards to a larger degree in LBOs than in MBOs (H3).  
 
Driven by external financing needs, managers could manipulate asset reserves in 
LBOs/MBOs. However, if the external financing capacity of a target relies more on general 
credit conditions than on its own credit characteris ics, there may not be a need to manipulate 
asset reserves. Notably, our sample period coincides with the boom of the high-yield bond 
market and of CDOs. Therefore, easy access to the debt market may dominate the impact of 
the balance sheet manipulation.  
 
3. Accounting manipulation proxies and empirical models 
 
3.1. Earnings management proxies 
Managers use accounting procedures and estimates that are conform to GAAP in order to 
present specific earnings numbers and influence equity valuation (Erickson and Wang, 1999). 
It is rather easy to change the earnings by means of accrual manipulation. The presented 
bottom-line results can also be influenced by real rnings management of which the 
advantages (relative to accrual management) are: (i) it is less likely to draw auditors’ and 
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regulators’ attention because real earnings management is related to operating decisions and 
(ii) there is no manipulation limit. Graham et al.’s (2005) survey reveals that executives are 
more willing to use earnings management through real activities than accrual management. 
Hence, we will investigate both types of earnings management. 
 
3.1.1. Accrual management proxies 
To measure discretionary (abnormal or manipulated) accruals, regression-based models have 
been developed for which Dechow et al. (1995) and Balatbat and Lim (2003) demonstrate 
that the modified-Jones model performs best5. S ill, Kothari et al. (2005) are concerned that 
ignoring the financial performance in those regression models leads to spurious results, in 
particular when companies experience an unusual earnings performance. Therefore, we adopt 
two approaches: First, we directly add an additional performance control variable to our 
accrual model in order to exclude abnormal accruals resulting from mean reversion in the 
performance (or performance momentum). Furthermore, as abnormal accruals measured from 
this performance-adjusted modified-Jones regression m del (PAMJ) may comprise abnormal 
accruals arising from common manipulation incentives ( .g. compensation incentives or 
meeting analysts’ forecasts) or random effects induce  by other events, we further adjust the 
abnormal accruals for (a) industry average abnormal accruals or (b) average abnormal 
accruals in the same size group within the same industry 6 . Second, we use a 
performance-matched approach whereby we match the buyout target with a non-buyout 
company with the same two-digit SIC code and with the closest performance in the year of 
the buyout. To recapitulate, we start from total accruals and apply the following: (i) the 
regression-based model removes the normal accruals from the actual total accruals, the 
performance-adjustment subtracts the performance-related abnormal accruals, and the 
mean-adjustment or matched approach excludes the non-event abnormal accruals; (ii) 
Likewise, the performance-matching removes the normal accruals and makes a performance 
                                                             
5 DeAngelo (1986) uses a random walk model to calculate abnormal accruals and thus assumes that changes in 
the nondiscretionary part of total accruals equal zero. However, Dechow (1992) empirically shows that ere is a 
significant negative serial correlation in accruals changes. Jones (1991) develops a regression model to predict 
normal accruals and hence calculate abnormal accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones model by 
subtracting changes in receivables (which are not ex g nous) from changes in sales to predict normal working 
capital accruals. Dechow and Dichev (2002) use the operating cash flow to calculate abnormal accruals, but this 
operating cash flow based model only captures working capital induced abnormal accruals and ignores 
long-term abnormal accruals. 
6 For each year and each two-digit SIC code industry, we divide the control observations portfolio into terciles 
by ranking firms according to their total assets. We then match the buyout company with the non-buyout 
companies based on the same size tercile in the sam year and the same two-digit SIC code. We name this 
approach as the same size group matching. 
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and non-event accrual adjustment. As a consequence, the remaining part of the abnormal 
accruals (calculated by means of either approach) captures the industry-adjusted 
buyout-specific manipulation. 
 
The performance-adjusted modified -Jones regression model (PAMJ) 
To measure the PAMJ model, we cross-sectionally estimate the discretionary accruals for 
each year using all firm-year observations with thesame two-digit SIC code. There are 
important advantages of this approach relative to a time-series one, because PAMJ (i) 
imposes less restrictions on data - it does not requi  long time-period accounting information; 
(ii) partially controls for industry-wide factors which affect total accruals; and (iii) allows the 
coefficients to vary across time (Kasnik, 1999). Furthermore, Peasnell et al. (2000) state that 
the cross-sectional model is more able to capture the magnitudes of accrual management. The 
expectations model is measured as follows: 
i,t i,t i,t i,t
0 1 2 3 i,t i,t
i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1
TACC (∆Sales - ∆Receivables ) PPE1
= β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β ROA + ε
Assets Assets Assets Assets
(1) 
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TAAC stands for the total accruals defined as TAACi,t = 
EBXIi,t-OCFi,t , the difference between Earnings Before Extraordinay Items (EBXI)
7 and 
Cash Flow from Operations (OCF) 8. ∆Salei,t and ∆Receivablesi,t stand for changes in sales 
and receivables, respectively. PPEi,t is gross Property, Plant and Equipment a d Assetsi,t-1 
represents the total book value of assets. Kothari et al. (2005) demonstrates that using 
contemporary ROAi,t produces less miss-specified tests relative to lagged ROA i,t-1. All 
variables, except ROAi,t, are scaled by lagged total assets to mitigate hetroskedasticity in 
residuals. The normal accruals, NTAACi,t, are then calculated as follows: 
i,t i,t i,t
i,t 0 1 2 3 i,t
i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1
(∆Sales - ∆Receivables ) PPE1
N TAAC = β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β RO A
Assets Assets Assets
% % % % (2) 
Hence, the predicted raw abnormal total accruals RAW_ABN_TAACi,t are the difference 
between observed total accruals and normal total accru ls: 
                                                             
7 Sales minus cost of sales and SG&A expenses give the operating income; adjusting for other operations 
related revenues and expenses leads to Profit before Interest; minus net interest payable yields the profit before 
tax; minus tax gives Profit after Tax; and minus minor ty interest yields the Earnings (or Profit) before 
Extraordinary items. 
8 Hribar and Collins (2002) state that accrual estimates calculated from balance sheets can be contaminated by 
measurement error and therefore prefer accruals from cash flow statement. For instance, M&As increase net 
current assets on the balance sheet, but do not affect the income statement account. Ball and Shivakumr (2008) 
confirm that the balance sheet approach is biased to upward earnings management and the amount of 
discretionary accrual is overestimated.   
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T A A C
i, tR A W _ A B N _ T A A C = - N T A A C
i, t i , tA sse ts
i , t - 1
                                 (3) 
To remove the non-event specific abnormal accruals, we subtract the mean abnormal accruals 
of the control observations (firms in the same year and with the same two-digit SIC code) 
from the raw abnormal accruals, which yields the industry-adjusted buyout-specific abnormal 
accruals: 
M adj_ABN_TAAC = RAW _ABN_TAAC - M ean_ABN_TAACi,t i,t i,t               (4) 
For our robust tests, we will also subtract the mean abnormal accruals of the control 
observations in the same size group within an industry from RAW_ABN_TAACi,t and label it 
as MadjSize_ABN_TAACi,t. 
 
 The performance-matched modified -Jones regression model (PMMJ) 
An alternative approach to control for performance consists of adjusting the estimated 
abnormal accruals by subtracting the estimated abnormal accruals of a performance-matched 
company. While the notation remains the same as above, we first estimate the expectations 
model without a performance regressor.  
i,t i,t i,t i,t
0 1 2 i,t
i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1
TACC (∆Sales - ∆Receivables ) PPE1
= β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + ε
Assets Assets Assets Assets
        (5) 
which yields the normal accruals: 
i ,t i ,t i ,t
i ,t 0 1 2
i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i,t - 1
(∆ S a le s - ∆ R e c e iv a b le s ) P P E1
N T A A C = β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ]
A s s e ts A s s e ts A s s e ts
% % %    (6) 
and enables us to calculate the predicted raw abnormal accruals: 
T A A C
i , tR A W _ A B N _ T A A C = - N T A A C
i , t i , tA s s e t s
i , t - 1
                                 (7) 
We then select for each firm in the buyout year a mtched firm from the non-buyout 
companies with the same two-digit SIC code and with the closest ROAi,t. Raw abnormal 
accruals are calculated for both the buyout samples and the control observations and the 
difference comprises the industry-adjusted buyout-specific abnormal accruals:  
( ) ( )_ _  _ _sam ple conRAW ABN TAAC RAW ABN TAAC trolABN_TAAC =i,t i,t i,t−  (8) 
 
3.1.2. Real earnings management proxies 
The three most common types of real earnings manipulat on comprise: (i) Sales manipulation; 




Sale manipulation occurs when managers (temporarily) influence earnings and thus the 
bottom line earnings numbers by changing the sales price or/and credit terms. In a buyout 
context, managers attempt to lower the sales and thus the earnings by imposing a sales price 
premium or/and offering less lenient credit terms. For instance, by temporarily reducing 
lenient credit terms, customers may delay their purchases in the current period. Consequently, 
the sales decline and the earnings are deflated, but given the tightening of the credit terms, the 
collection of current period’s sales increases which boosts the cash inflow. All in all, the 
effect of this type of sales manipulation is expected o result in a higher level of operating 
cash flow. 
 
Prior to the buyout, managers can slow down production in order to reduce net earnings. On 
the one hand, by producing fewer units, the fixed costs are spread over a small number of 
units and the fixed cost per unit augments and, since the production is below its optimal scale, 
the marginal cost per unit rises as well. Hence, th total cost per unit increases, which implies 
higher reported cost of goods and lower operating margins. On the other hand, the other 
production and holding costs for inventory decline. As a result, the total production costs, a 
sum of the cost of goods and changes in inventory, are reduced as the decline in the latter is 
expected to dominate the increase in the former (Roychowdhury, 2006) which leads to a low 
ratio of production costs to sales.  
 
Finally, the management can also increase the discretionary expenses by e.g. expanding the 
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) to make the current earnings decline9. 
 
Our approach to estimate the abnormal real activities manipulation is also based on 
cross-sectional models. We use both performance-adjusted and performance-matched 
methods to derive industry-adjusted buyout-specific real earnings management proxies.  
 
Sales Manipulation  
Our expectations model is formulated as follows: 
i ,t i ,t i ,t
0 1 2 3 i ,t i ,t
i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1
O C F S a l e s ∆ S a l e s1
= β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β R O A + ε
A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s
(9) 
                                                             




with all the variables as defined above. We obtain he normal operating cash flows (NOCFi,t) 
by means of the β-estimates from the above equation : 
i ,t i ,t
i ,t 0 1 2 3 i ,t
i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1
S a l e s ∆ S a l e s1
N O C F = β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β R O A
A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s
% % % % (10) 
To remove the non-event specific abnormal cash flows, e subtract the mean abnormal 
operating cash flows of the control firms (of the same year and with the same two-digit SIC 
code) from the raw operating cash flows, which yields the industry-adjusted event-specific 
abnormal operating cash flows: 
M adj_A BN _O C F = R AW _A BN _O C F - M ean_ABN _O C Fi,t i,t i,t                (11) 
As before, we also use two alternative calculations: we subtract the mean abnormal operating 
cash flows of the control firms in the same size group within the same industry from 
RAW_ABN_OCFi,t and label it MadjSize_ABN_OCFi,t. We also use a performance-matched 
approach: a matched firm is selected by a non-buyout c mpany in the same two-digit SIC 
code and year with the closest ROAi,t. Raw abnormal operating cash flows are calculated for 
both the sample and the control observations. The difference is the buyout-specific abnormal 
operating cash flows:  
( ) ( )_ _  _ _sa m p le cR A W A B N O C F R A W A B N o rO o lC F n tA B N _ O C F =i,t i,t i,t−   (12) 
 
Production manipulation 
We take the following production cost expectation model as our basis: 
i,t i,t i,t i,t -1
0 1 2 3 4 i,t i,t
i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1
PROD Sales ∆Sales ∆Sales1
= β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + +β [ ] + β ROA + ε
Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
(13) 
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, PRODi,t is the production cost and equals the sum of the 
Cost of Goods (COGSi,t) and the change in Inventory (∆INVENTORYi,t). The normal 
production cost is calculated as: 
i,t i,t i,t -1
i,t 0 1 2 3 4 i,t
i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1 i,t -1
Sales ∆Sales ∆Sales1
N P R O D = β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β R O A
A ssets A ssets A ssets A ssets
% % % % % (14) 
tiNPROD , is the normal production cost, calculated from the parameter estimates of the 
expectations model. As before, to remove the non-event specific abnormal production cost, 
we subtract the mean abnormal production cost of the control firms (of the same year and 
with the same two-digit SIC code) from the raw production cost. The industry-adjusted 
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event-specific abnormal production cost is then:10 
Madj_ABN_PROD = RAW_ABN_PROD - Mean_ABN_PRODi,t i,t i,t               (15) 
 
3.2. Asset revaluation manipulation.  
Asset revaluation is calculated as the change in revaluation reserves11 on the balance sheet 
(Black et al., 1998; Cheng and Lin, 2009). Asset revaluation reserves’ reduction (inflation) in 
the manipulation year implies downward (upward) revaluation. As revaluations are 
industry-specific, we further subtract the industry’  average revaluation or the average 
revaluation by the same size group within the same industry from the raw asset revaluation 
numbers to capture the industry-adjusted buyout-specific abnormal revaluation. As changes 
in asset reserves may reflect transfers among different reserve accounts, we collect detailed 
information on revaluation reserves from annual repo ts and record the frequency of four 
different types of revaluation while considering transferring reserves: (i) “No change” 
indicates that the asset revaluation reserves remain the same in both the manipulation and the 
prior year; (ii) “Upward revaluation” indicates that there are overstated revaluation activities 
in the manipulation year (relative to the year befor  the manipulation year); (iii) “Downward 
revaluation” captures the opposite case, and (iv) “Transfer” refers to the change in 
revaluation reserves arising from a transfer between th  revaluation reserves account and 
other reserves accounts12. 
 
3.3. The determinants of earnings management  
To analyze the determinants of earnings management, we ake the above proxies based on 
accruals, production, or sales manipulation and relate them to a set of firm, transaction, and 
industry characteristics which include the choice of the buyout type (MBO versus LBO). This 
induces a problem as the buyout type choice is not ex genous and can be influenced by the 
                                                             
10 We also use two alternative measures: the mean abnormal production cost of the control observations in the 
same size group within the same industry is subtracted from RAW_ABN_PRODi,t and label it as 
MadjSize_ABN_PRODi,t. We use a performance-matched approach: a matched firm is selected by a non-buyout 
company in the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest ROAi,t. Raw abnormal production cost is 
calculated for both sample and control observations. The difference is proxied as the event-specific abnormal 
production cost: ABN_PRODi,t=(RAW_ABN_PRODi,t)sample - (RAW_ABN_PRODi,t)control.  
11 Aboody et al. (1999) collect revaluation numbers from companies’ annual reports and cross check these 
numbers with data in Datastream. They report that only three discrepancies related to the 5485 firm-year 
observations. 
12 For instance, Usborne plc underwent buyout in 1998. The 1997 (1996) annual report showed £32000 (£84000) 
in the revaluation reserves account. The decline in r valuation reserves by £52000 is not due to revaluation, but 
arose from transferring out of revaluation reserves account to the P&L reserves account. Although a rev luation 
decrease could be noted, the sum of the revaluation reserves account and P&L reserves account remained the 
same and the equity was is not influenced by such transfers. 
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degree of earnings management as well as some firm specific characteristics such as the 
management’s equity stake or the degree of board independence. Given that the realized 
MBO as a proxy for the management engagement incentive is endogenous determined, we 
adopt a two-stage instrument variable method. The Zephyr database reveals that the deal 
initiation takes place almost one year prior to the actual buyout announcement. Furthermore, 
Ang et al.’s (2010) empirical evidence confirms that the causality is more likely to flow from 
the buyout decision to earnings manipulation. Therefore, the first stage regression models the 
buyout choice and the predicted buyout choice will be included in the second stage regression 
as an explanatory variable of the degree of earnings manipulation.  
 
The MBO versus LBO choice in year t-1 is a function of the variables at year t-2: 
,_ i tD u m M B O =  
e0 1 i,t - 2 2 i,t - 2
3 i,t - 2 4 i,t - 2 5 i,t - 2
6 i,t - 2 7 i,t - 2
8 i,t - 2 9 i,t - 2 10
β + β M anag m ent Ow n + β N on - Executive Ow n
+β  Largest O wner Instit + β  Independent D iretors + β  Board  Size
+β  Analysts   + β  LSE  L isting
+β  M TB + β  RO A + β  Cash i,t - 2 11 i,t - 2 12 i,t - 2
i,t
to Assets  + β  D ebt to Assets + β  S ize
+ YearFixedeffects + IndustryF ixedeffects + ε
(16) 
where the dependent variable is the realized buyout type (Dum_MBOi,t which equals one for 
an MBO and zero for an LBO). Management Owni,t-2 and Non-Executive Owni,t-2 are the 
respective percentages of equity held by the management team and the non-executive 
directors. Largest Owner Institi,t-2 equals one when the largest shareholder in the buyout 
company is institutional investors, and zero otherwise. Independent Directorsi,t-2, is the 
number of independent directors divided by board size. Board Sizei,t-2 is the number of board 
members. Analystsi,t-2 is the number of financial analysts following the buyout company. LSE 
Listingi,t-2 equals one in case of a listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and zero in 
case of a listing on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). MTBi,t-2 is the Market-to-Book 
ratio; Cash to Assetsi,t-2 is cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; Debt to 
Assetsi,t-2 is total debt over total assets, and Sizei,t-2 is the logarithm of total assets. 
 
The choice of variables included in this first stage regression is affected by the reasons for the 
buyout that are usually mentioned in the official offer documents. As a key reason is “to 
simplify the management structure to bring it more in line with companies’ prospects”, we 
include managerial ownership. Another frequently mentioned reason for a buyout is “to 
remove costs associated with a listing” as companies with illiquid stocks are not able to 
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attract sufficient investor recognition and the listing costs may therefore outweigh the 
benefits. Illiquidity is often linked with high ownership concentration which implies that 
shareholders intending to dispose of their shares may have little alternative than to sell to the 
management or a buyout sponsor (Fidrmuc et al., 2013). Therefore, we expect that low 
visibility (proxied by analyst following and type of market listing) positively correlates to 
MBOs. The board needs to issue an independent evaluation of possible buyout choices and 
make a recommendation to investors. Therefore, a more independent board and a stronger 
ownership stake held by the non-executive directors may imply less collusion with the 
management, which may reduce the probability of an MBO. Lastly, we also include the cash 
balance and leverage ratio in the first stage regression. 
 
In the second stage, we replace the MBO dummy by the predicted MBO from the first-step 
regression. 
,i tA b n o r m a l =  
( )
0 1 i ,t 2 i ,t 3 i ,t - 2
4 i ,t i ,t - 2 5 i ,t - 2 i ,t - 2
i ,t
β + β P r e d _ D u m _ M B O + β  D u m _ E x te r n a l  F in a n c in g + β S P P E
+ β D u m _ E x te r n a l  F in a n c in g * S P P E + β  N O A I N V R E C
+ Y e a r F ix e d e f fe c ts + In d u s tr y F ix e d e f fe c ts + ε
       (17) 
The dependent variable Abnormali,t-1 stands for MadjSize_ABN_TAACi,t-1 (or 
Madj_ABN_TAACi,t-1 or ABN_TAACi,t-1), MadjSize_ABN_OCFi,t-1, and 
MadjSize_ABN_PRODi,t-1 which are abnormal accruals/operating cash flows/production costs 
of the buyout companies adjusted for the mean accruls/operating cash flow/production costs 
of the same size group. The management engagement incentive variable is proxied by 
Pred_Dum_MBOi,t. We expect a negative coefficient on this variable ecause in MBOs 
managers are expected to manipulate the earnings downwards and benefit from a subsequent 
low purchase price (relative to LBOs). The variable Dum_External Financingi,t
13 proxies for 
the external financing incentive and equals one when the target raises external funds at the 
transaction. The indicator variable is expected to have a positive sign, as the external 
financing ability will depend on positive earnings and thus mitigate the downward 
manipulation. SPPEi,t-2 (property, plant and equipment (PPE)) scaled by the beginning total 
assets) captures the availability of tangible assets that can serve as collateral. The internal 
manipulation capacity is captured by the net operating assets (NOAi,t-2), which is equity minus 
cash and marketable securities plus total debt (at the beginning of the year), divided by total 
                                                             
13 We use the dummy variable to ensure the proxy is not driven by the type of financing and extreme values of 
external funds. Moreover, some transactions only mention that they have external borrowing without releasing 
the exact amount.  
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sales (of the previous year). The larger the accumulated NOAi,t-2, the lower the possibility to 
manipulate accruals. The nature of accrual accounting indicates that the total amount of 
accruals is fixed in the long run. Therefore, managers’ opportunistic manipulation in one 
period has a reverse effect on manipulation in subsequent periods (Barton and Simko, 2002). 
When earnings are manipulated upwards by accruals, the value of the net assets on the 
balance sheet increases. All else being equal, the overstated net assets become less efficient at 
generating a given level of sales in the following periods, which explains the negative 
relationship between the level of net operating assets and accrual manipulation. The level of 
the stock of inventories and receivables (INVRECi,t-2) captures the managerial flexibility to 
manipulate real activities. The stock of inventories and receivables is positively correlated 
with the flexibility to manipulate real earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). We also add time and 
industry fixed-effects. All the aforementioned accounting variables are lagged; variable 
definitions are presented in Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Data description  
 
4.1 Data source and sample selection 
This study comprises all completed whole-company UK buyouts that occurred in the period 
1997 to 2007. The period corresponds with the second wave in the UK, which picked up in 
1997 and slowed down over the course of time and then fell abruptly with the emergence of 
the financial crises starting at the end of 2007. The transactions are retrieved from the 
database of the Mergers and Acquisitions of the Security Data Company’s online database 
(SDC), Venture Expert of Thomson One, Zephyr of Burea  van Dijk, Centre for Management 
Buyout Research (CMBOR), and Capital IQ. All deal information has been cross-checked by 
means of these datasets. To identify whether at leas one member of the current management 
team participates in the transaction and stays in the firm subsequent to the buyout (our 
definition of an MBO), we gather the deal’s details from the above datasets as well as from 
the news releases in the Factiva, LexisNexis, Google news, and the offer documents. The 
accounting data is mainly obtained from DataStream (DS), but we complement missing 
information by the annual reports downloaded from Thomson One and Fame. Corporate 
governance proxies are collected from annual reports and external financing information are 




We collect a total of 407 buyout transactions and retain 16814 public-to-private transactions 
which satisfy the following criteria:  
 We retain 353 whole-company public-to-private buyouts (PtP buyouts): 14 
private-to-private buyouts and 32 divisional buyouts are dropped for reasons of data 
limitations. Eight companies that still remained public companies were also not included 
in the final database. 
 Missing data in Datastream reduced the sample to 299 buyouts. 
 We excluded the financial services industry (SIC codes 6000-7000) and the regulated 
industries (SIC codes 4400-5000), which reduced the sample to 233. 
 We faced problems with availability or quality of (accounting) information (in spite of 
disposing of the offer documents) and reduced the sample to 199 (ten companies had no 
SIC code; for twelve firms the net CF information was unavailable; ten firms lacked 
information on receivables; and two did not disclose any information on PPE). 
 As small companies are exempt from external auditing, we exclude these three firms, 
hence retaining a sample of 196 firms.15  
 The inability to find a matching control firm leaves a sample of 178. 
 We dropped ten observations, because we required at leas  10 observations in each 
two-digit SIC industry per year to ensure the statiic power in the cross-sectional 
regressions. In the remaining 168 observations, we have all the necessary data to 
calculate the various accounting manipulation proxies for 163 transactions. 
 
4.2. Data description 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of buyouts over time: the number of the buyouts has 
risen since 1997 and peaked around 1999-2000, consiste t with Wright’s et al. (2009) 
evidence that UK LBOs reached a new record in 2000 with total value of 38.4 billion euro. 
Following the stock market downturn of early 2000, the buyout market rebounded in late 
2002 and 2003. Our sample includes companies from a wide business spectrum with most 
buyouts occurring in business services, retailing, and manufacturing industries. In the 
                                                             
14 This is not a small sample in the light of the US research on MBO/LBOs: DeAngelo’s (1986) sample consists 
of 64 MBOs (1973-1982). Perry and Williams’ (1994) study includes 175 MBOs (1981-1988), and Fischer and 
Louis’ (2008) sample has 138 observations (1985-2005). Ang et al. (2010) study 163 MBOs (1997-2007). These 
US studies only require a minimum of 5 observations for their cross-sectional regressions, but we adopt more 
strict requirements for our cross-sectional regression .  
15 According to Company Act 2006, small companies are those with (a) Turnover < 2.8million GBP& Total 




high-tech industry, more buyouts have occurred (accounting for almost 14% of the total 
transactions). This trend is in conjunction with Kaplan and Strömberg’s (2009) view that the 
industry scope of buyouts is broadening beyond the mature, high cash flow, high debt 
capacity type of industries.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The total assets of the average sample firm equal GBP 171.34 million in the year prior to the 
buyout. MBOs are relatively smaller, faster growing, less levered, but more cash-rich 
companies than LBOs. In two thirds of our buyout sample, at least one incumbent manager is 
involved in the transaction and stays on subsequent to the buyout-when we label the 
transaction as an MBO. MBOs are associated with a large ex ante equity stakes held by 
managers (18.3% versus only 6.0% in LBOs) and the management is more frequently the 
largest shareholder. Institutional ownership concentration does not differ between MBOs and 
LBOs. LBOs have a higher proportion of independent directors than MBOs (47.82% versus 
43.68%) and are followed by twice as many analysts16. 
 
5. Results  
 
5.1 Earnings manipulation 
5.1.1. Accrual management 
We first calculate normal (or expected) accruals by means of the performance-adjusted 
modified-Jones model (Panel A of Table 3) which is ba ed on 163 cross-sectional regressions. 
The factor most influencing the expected total accruals is the scaled PPE (β2), the long-term 
component of total accruals. Expectedly, this parameter estimate is negative, because PPE is 
related to depreciation which negatively contributes to total accruals. Of the 163 
cross-sectional regressions, 87.20% of the scaled PPE’s coefficients are significant at the 
conventional levels. The coefficient on the change in net sales (β1) is negative and 
insignificant in more than half of regressions. More importantly, ROAi,t plays a significantly 
positive role (β3) as a control variable, which justifies the performance adjustment in the 
modified-Jones model. The concern that ROAi,t partially captures the effect of sales is not 
substantiated, as their correlation is low and insig ificant. The model’s mean adjusted R2 for 
the 163 cross-sectional expectation models amounts to 47.2% (significantly higher than the 
                                                             
16 The correlation between all independent variables is small (below the absolute value of 0.5) with exception of 
a positive correlation of 0.6 between the number of analysts following the firm and firm size. To avoid 
multicollinarity, these variables are not simultaneously included in the same model.  
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non-performance-adjusted Jones model with an R2 of only 27.0%).  
 
When we compare the real total accruals with the predicted ones from Panel A, resulting in 
the raw abnormal total accruals (RAW_ABN_TAAC) of Panel B of Table 3, we observe that 
buyout companies have negative total raw accruals (-3%). This degree of downward accrual 
management is comparable with the US literature (Perry and Williams, 1994; Fisher and 
Louis, 2008). Both MBOs and LBOs have negative accrual management (-3% and -2%, 
respectively, but the difference is not significant; Panel B of Table 3). When we adjust the 
raw abnormal accruals for the industry-mean total accruals or for the mean of the same 
industry size group, we can draw two conclusions: (i) the abnormal accrual figures become 
significantly more negative: for all buyout companies, they decline from -3% to -12%. This 
implies that non-buyout companies are generally subject to positive accrual management (by 
9% of the assets). This finding is unsurprising, because positive manipulation can affect 
managers’ bonuses and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ expectations which may 
trigger a positive market reaction. (ii) The difference in industry-adjusted abnormal accruals 
of MBOs and LBOs is striking: downward accrual management is twice as high in MBOs 
(-15%) than in LBOs (-7%).  
 
In sum, from the analysis of the industry-adjusted buyout-specific accruals approaches, we 
reach these conclusions: (i) In spite of the improved corporate governance over the past 15 
years (Guo et al., 2011) and enhanced accounting regulation, downward earnings 
management preceding buyouts still frequently takes place, as indicated consistently by three 
types of accrual proxies. (ii) MBOs are associated with larger deflated accrual manipulation 
than LBOs. The industry-mean adjusted abnormal accru ls of MBOs account for 
approximately 29% of reduced earnings and are thus not only statistically but also 
economically significant. LBOs are also associated with negative earnings management as 
well which may very well be the consequence of the ‘love letters’ sent by bidding companies: 
when managers cooperate with buyout sponsors to help reduce the transaction value, the 
losses of reduced premiums for managers may be compensated by the monetary rewards 
offered by bidding companies. The findings of this subsection strongly support hypothesis 1 
(managerial engagement hypothesis) that managers deflate earnings numbers by means of 
accrual management. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
As a robustness check, we use a performance-matched modified-Jones regression model, 
22 
 
which controls for the effect of performance on accruals by assigning to each target a 
non-buyout counterpart from the same industry and a performance profile that is similar in 
the manipulation year. The difference in abnormal accruals of the buyout targets and that of 
control companies yields peer-controlled abnormal accruals. The results of this analysis 
yields very similar results17: for both MBOs and LBOs, the downward accruals manipulation 
is significantly negative, but the manipulation in MBOs is even much larger (about eight 
times) than in LBOs.  
 
5.1.2. Real earnings management 
We turn to real earnings management and focus on sales and production manipulation. The 
expectations model for the former is presented in Pa el A of Table 4. The contemporaneous 
sales are, as expected, strongly positively correlated to the operating cash flows (OCF), and 
so is ROA. The explanatory power of the model is high with an average adjusted R2 of 
73.17%. Panel B of Table 4 indicates that the abnormal operating cash flows are positive for 
both MBOs and LBOs targets, which is in line with the prediction that managers will delay 
sales to depress net income by using real earnings management. For instance, a reduction in 
lenient credit terms will decrease the sales volumes and therefore lead to low earnings 
number, but will increase the collection of current sales’ receipts and thus raise the level of 
OCF. We observe that sales manipulation is carried out in MBOs (the four proxies are 
statistically significantly different from zero), but the evidence for LBOs is weaker. This 
finding supports hypothesis 1 that managers manipulate earnings downward by delaying sales. 
One further point regarding our industry-adjusted buyout-specific approaches needs to be 
made: since both the industry-mean adjusted OCF and the same industry-size group adjusted 
OCF are lower than the raw OCF, it implies that theindustry peers (the non-MBO and 
non-LBO firms) engage in negative sales manipulation, which is used to boost earnings 
numbers. This is consistent with the motive of positive accrual management used by the 
industry peers for increasing the bonus or meeting/beating analyst forecast. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In relation to production manipulation, we observe that sales are a key predictor of the 
production costs (Panel A of Table 5). This coefficient’s magnitude (0.75) is comparable with 
that Roychowdhury’s (2006) model, namely (0.78) and the sign of sales is positive, as 
expected. The adjusted R2 amounts to 96.61%. Panel B of Table 5 further supports hypothesis 
                                                             
17 The results are not shown for reasons of concisenes; tables are available upon request.  
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1, in that negative production manipulation occurs p ior to buyouts, which leads to lower 
earnings figures. That is, managers intend to slow d n production to manage earnings 
downwards. We also disclose that MBOs are related to significant under-production 
manipulation, while production manipulation in LBOs does not occur according to the 
industry-adjusted buyout-specific and the matching-adjusted approaches. Buyout targets 
decrease production while industry competitors increase production to inflate the earnings 
numbers, which is consistent with the role of positive accrual management and negative sales 
manipulation.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In sum, in addition to the downward accrual management, we present further evidence on 
negative real earnings management preceding buyout transactions. What is more, MBOs are 
associated with more negative earnings manipulation relative to LBOs. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported by both accrual management and real earnings management. 
 
Since accrual management and real earnings management may be correlated, we report the 
correlation matrix in Table 6. Abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flows are significantly 
negatively correlated, which implies that companies are engaging in accrual management and 
real earnings management at the same time. Likewise, the negative correlation between 
abnormal cash flows and abnormal production costs suggests that both types of real earnings 
management are initiated by the average MBO. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.2. Asset revaluation 
Whereas in LBOs, upward asset revaluation takes place, this is not the case in MBOs (as 
reflected in the abnormal revaluation numbers of Panel A of Table 7). Given that asset 
revaluation is industry-specific (industries with hig  capital intensity can revalue their assets 
to a larger extent), we control for industry effects by adjusting the raw figures for (i) the 
industry mean; (ii) the mean of the same industry-size group, and (iii) peer-effects by 
employing a matched control sample of non-buyouts. These three adjustments consistently 
show that managers do not manipulate the value of the assets through revaluation in MBOs, 
but do so in case of LBOs. In the context of the results of the previous subsection, a logical 
explanation is that MBO managers intend to keep corporate value as low as possible. In 
contrast, LBO managers who anticipate that they will not be involved in the post-LBO phase 
can facilitate the buyout by revaluing the assets upwards which reduces the debt-to-equity 
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ratio and in turn increases the debt capacity of the un-levered transaction.  
When we dig deeper into the components of the asset revaluation reserves and distinguish 
between pure asset revaluation changes and the changes following the transfers of asset 
revaluation reserves to other reserve accounts, we show in Panel B of Table 7 that although 
MBO managers have an incentive to revaluate their assets downwards, they do not do so in 
70.30% of the cases. The main reason is that of these 70.30% of the MBOs, 87% are not able 
to decrease the revaluation reserves because their asset revaluation reserves were already at 
zero prior to the buyout.  
In short, when we examine the abnormal revaluation reserves, LBOs are associated with 
more frequent upward revaluations than MBOs. This partially supports the Hypothesis 2 of 
external financing incentive: upward revaluations are used to increase the borrowing capacity 
by ex ante reducing the debt-to-equity ratio. It also provides evidence on Hypothesis 3 that 
LBOs are associated with more upward revaluation tha  MBOs. However, it should be noted 
that the evidence is not very strong as in absolute terms, neither the MBOs nor the LBOs 
frequently revalue their assets. The reason may be that when credit markets are booming, 
revaluations are not really necessary. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
To evaluate the robustness of our primary findings on accounting manipulation, we conduct 
four robustness checks. 
 
First, it is possible that the management has made the manipulation decision not in the year or 
months prior to the buyout transaction but at an earlier time. Therefore, we measure all 
accounting manipulation proxies at a time preceding the transaction by more than one year 
(the fiscal year is then ending 13 to 24 months prior to the buyout). Overall, we hardly find 
any significant results for the year prior to what we call the manipulation year. If there is 
evidence of accounting manipulation or asset revaluation, it occurs immediately preceding 
the buyouts18.  
 
                                                             
18 This finding also partially supports the expectation that the causality is more likely to go from the buyout 
decision to earnings manipulation and not the other way around. Tables with results are available upon request.  
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Second, we examine whether the enactment of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code 
of 2003 reduces the degree of accounting manipulation. Following the introduction of 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, the ‘Combined Code’ of 1998 was revised in 2003 to 
improve financial reporting quality and the accountability of the board of directors, the audit 
committees, and the auditors. We partition the sample period into two subperiods: 1997-2003 
and 2004-2007. From the abnormal accruals part of Table 8, we discover that active accrual 
manipulation was larger before the change in corporate governance regulation (the 1997-2003 
subperiod), although it still takes place subsequent to 2003. In contrast, the other 
manipulation techniques (related to production costs and asset revaluations) are more 
frequently used after the change in the accounting regime, which may be induced by the fact 
that these manipulation methods are more difficult to detect. This finding is also consistent 
with US evidence: since the adoption of SOX, companies shift from accrual management to 
real earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008). When we redo the above tests for the sample 
of MBOs only, we find that the above findings are upheld.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Third, we base our tests on the differences between the medians for the MBOs and LBOs (for 
the panels B of the Tables 3-5 and 7) and find that the results are very similar19. 
 
Fourth, we also perform a time-series approach to estimate abnormal accruals, operating cash 
flows and production costs. For each individual buyout company, we run a time-series 
regression using company data over a six year period ending in the year before the 
manipulation year to measure the normal accruals, operating cash flows, and production costs, 
and hence both accrual and real earnings management. The limitation of this method is that a 
sufficiently long time series (we take at least six years) of accounting numbers prior to the 
manipulation period ought to be available for each firm in order to estimate the parameter 
coefficients. Although this approach reduces the sample size to 72 observations, we still find 
negative accrual management preceding MBOs. 
 
5.4. The determinants of earnings manipulation 
In this section, we concentrate on the question whyfirms resort to accounting manipulation: 
does the management engagement incentive dominate or th external financing reason?  
                                                             




5.4.1. Managerial incentives versus external financing reasons 
It is important to note that when we relate the earnings manipulation variables to the 
MBO/LBO dummy variable, the latter captures the ex ante probability of management 
engagement but measures it with error. Some companies consider an MBO but end up with 
an LBO which imposes a bias on the resulting coeffici nts from the probit models. 
Furthermore, the type of buyout is not exogenous to the degree of earnings manipulation. To 
address these concerns, we make use of a stage instrumen al variables method. The first-stage 
equation models the MBO choice and the second equation explains the accounting 
manipulation behavior. So, we test whether or not managers manipulate earnings when they 
perceive the buyout type. As suggested by Berry (2011), an OLS model is preferred in the 
first stage even for an independent dummy variable, th  reason being that only OLS 
estimation produces first stage residuals that are uncorrelated with the covariates and fitted 
values. As a robustness check, we will also employ a probit model for the first stage 
estimation following Wooldridge (2002).  
 
We choice a set of instrumental variables (IVs) based on the economic rationale underlying 
the buyouts: managerial ownership concentration, non-executive ownership concentration, 
and firm size. Panel A of Table 9 demonstrates that t ese IVs are significantly related to the 
MBO decision. The higher is the manager’s equity investment in the target company, the 
higher probability of an MBO. When the level of non-executive ownership is higher and the 
target firm is larger, the company is more likely to undergo an LBO. Smaller firms are more 
likely to be acquired through an MBO. The Hausman endogeneity test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the realized buyout type is exogenous. A p-value of 0.26 from 
overindentifying restriction test indicates that at least one of the IVs is exogenous. To test the 
relevance of the IVs, the F-statistics are required to be larger than 10 to avoid weak IVs; our 
F-test amounts to 18.4 which implies that our IVs are characterized by a sufficiently large 
correlation with the endogenous regressor.  
 
The main finding of the second stage is that the prdicted MBO proxy is significantly 
negatively related to the abnormal accruals (Model (1) of Panel B of Table 9) and a positive 
relation with sales manipulation (Model (2)). Both these findings support Hypothesis 1 in that 
managers are more prone to participate in accounting manipulation in order to obtain a lower 
purchase price via both accrual and real earnings manipulation. In case of an MBO, the mean 
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abnormal accruals is 18.4% of total assets lower than t e accruals of firms of the same size 
group and within the same industry. This decrease leads to a decline in earnings by 30%, 
which is also economically significant. The external financing incentive does not emerge as a 
reason for accrual or real earnings manipulation. The reason for its insignificance may be that 
over the period 1997 to 2007 a fast-growing high-yield bond market emerged (the GBP 5.4 
billion high-yield bond market of 1997, soared to 32 billion in 2007). Axelson et al. (2013) 
argue that the main robust predictor of buyout leverag  consists of the credit market 
conditions of the high-yield bond market. Thus, ourHypothesis 2 on the external financing 
incentive is not upheld. The inactive revaluation frequency presented in Panel B of Table 7 is 
squared with this finding.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
5.4.2. Robustness tests 
To verify the results of the above subsection, we perform four robustness tests. 
 
First, as an alternative dependent variable for accrual management, we use the 
performance-matched abnormal accruals (see Section 3). The perceived MBO probability still 
has a significantly negative impact on accrual manipulation (-0.151 in Model (1) of Table 10). 
When we use either the raw abnormal operating cash flow (OCF) or the industry mean 
adjusted OCF as a proxy for sales manipulation, the perceived MBO remains positive and 
statistically significant (0.077 in Model (2)). 
 
Second, we use two alternative estimation approaches. In the first stage, we use a probit 
model (rather than OLS) to predict the MBO likelihood and then use this predicted value as a 
regressor in the second stage. We confirm that the management engagement incentive plays a 
crucial role in negative accrual manipulation (Model (3)). We also apply a GMM IV approach 
and obtain a coefficient for the predicted MBO (-0.186 in Model (4)) which happens to be 
similar to that that of the two-stage approach (-0.184). As the standard errors are close, there 
is almost no efficiency gains from GMM approach relative to a two-staged method. 
 
Third, we explore the effect of the enactment of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code 
of 2003 on both accrual and real activity manipulation. Model (5) of Table 10 shows that the 
implementation of the revised Code (as captured by the interaction term) mitigates the 
magnitude of manipulation in the case of an MBO. This suggests that the revised Code has 
28 
 
improved the financial statement quality of a potentially problematic group of firms. Model 
(6) estimates the effect of the revised Code on sales manipulation. After the Code’s revision, 
the real earnings manipulation in predicted MBOs is reduced as well. Taking these two pieces 
of evidence on accrual and real earning manipulations together, we could argue that the 
revised Code enhances the reporting integrity of suspected companies during the MBO event, 
which could therefore lead to more fair and transparent transactions.  
 
Fourth, to verify that the causality goes from the buyout decision to earnings management, 
we estimate the realized buyout type dummy variable on different proxies for earnings 
manipulation in addition to factors influencing buyo t choice. In untabulated results, we do 
not find any significant impact of earnings management on the choice of buyout type. The 
key determinants remain management equity ownership, non-executive shareholdings and 
company size.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate accounting manipulation prior to buyout transactions in the UK 
during the second buyout wave of 1997 to 2007 (when t  buyout market collapsed following 
the banking crisis). We find that buyout targets engage in negative earnings manipulation, 
through both accrual management and real earnings management. Moreover, MBOs (wherein 
at least one member of the management team will be nvolved in the subsequent buyout) are 
associated with significantly more manipulation relative to LBOs. This is not unexpected: 
when the management contemplates an MBO, negative earnings manipulation may 
negatively influence the acquisition price. This is evidence of managerial self-dealing. Our 
managerial engagement incentive hypothesis is strongly supported for UK MBOs. However, 
the external financing incentive (increasing earnings and cash flows may lead to higher 
valuation which may enable the firm to be acquired with more leverage) does not play a 
prominent role in our UK buyout setting. This findig is in line with the evidence of Axelson 
et al. (2013) in that the buyout leverage is not determined by standard capital structure factors. 
Manipulation through inactive asset reserves revaluation is also consistent with the 
insignificance of the external financing incentive. We also document that the implementation 
of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code (of 2003) leads to increases in real earnings 




Our study extends the related research along four dimensions. First, while the first US LBO 
wave of the 1980s is well analyzed, little evidence is provided on the accounting 
manipulation during the second LBO wave and outside the US. We show that accounting 
manipulations ahead of the UK buyouts still prevail. Second, we advance an 
industry-adjusted buyout-specific approach to have a better proxy for accounting 
manipulation. The industry adjustment removes the common components of abnormal 
accounting numbers and allows for varied accounting d scretion across industries. We further 
compare manipulation in MBOs and LBOs to examine buyout-event specific abnormal 
earnings behavior. Third, to explore the effect of c mpeting incentives on accounting 
manipulation, we address the endogeneity issue of the ex-post buyout type by using the 
two-stage IV approach. We show that the causality goes from the decision of the buyout to 
accounting manipulation rather than vice versa. Fourth, we evaluate the policy effect of the 
revision of UK Corporate Governance Code on reporting quality. Even through 
self-interested managers still attempt to maximize th ir wealth through accounting 
manipulation, the magnitude of manipulation in MBOs is mitigated after the implementation 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Table 1 defines the variables and presents the data sources. t stands for the buyout year, t-1 for the manipulation 
year, and t-2 is the year preceding the manipulation year. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
 
Variables Definition Source 
First stage regression dependent variable 
Dum_MBO  Dummy variable equals 1 in case of an MBO (at least one 
member of the pre-transaction management team 
participates in the buyout and subsequently stays in the 
firm), and 0 in case of an LBO (without subsequent 
involvement of the incumbent management) otherwise. 
SDC, Capital IQ, 
Zephyr, Venture 
Expert and news 
release. 
Second stage regression dependent variable 
ABN_TAAC Matched Abnormal Accruals: raw abnormal accruals minus 
abnormal accruals of matched control observations selected 
from non-buyout companies with same two-digit SIC code 
and in same year and with closest ROAi,t. 
Calculations with 
DataStream data 
MadjSize_ABN_TAAC Industry-Size Mean Adjusted Abnormal Accruals: raw 
abnormal accruals minus mean abnormal accruals of the 
control observations for same year and with same siz  
group at same two-digit SIC code. 
Calculations with 
DataStream data 
MadjSize_ABN_OCF Industry-Size Mean Adjusted Abnormal Operating Cash 
Flow: raw abnormal operating cash flow minus mean 
abnormal operating cash flow of control observations for 




MadjSize_ABN_PROD Industry-Size Mean Adjusted Abnormal Production Cost: 
raw abnormal production costs minus mean abnormal 
production costs of control observations for same year and 
with same size group at same two-digit SIC code. 
Calculations with 
DataStream data 





Panel B: First stage regression independent variables 
 
Variables Definition Source 
Analysts Number of financial analysts following pre-buyout target. DataStream 
Board Size Number of directors on the board. Annual reports 
Cash to Assets Cash and Marketable Securities divided by total assets of 
(pre-buyout) target. 
Annual report 
Debt to Assets Total debt divided by total assets of (pre-buyout) target. Annual report 
Independent Directors Proportion of independent directors on the board. Annual reports 
Largest Owner Instit Dummy variable equals 1 if an institutional investor is the 
largest shareholder in pre-buyout target and 0 otherwis . 
Annual reports 
LSE Listing Dummy variable equals 1 when listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, and 0 when listed on the Alternative Investm nt 
Market. 
DataStream 
Management Own Ownership stake (%) held by management in pre-buyout 
target. 
Annual reports 
MTB Market-to-book value of (pre-buyout) target. DataStream 
Non-Executive Own Ownership stake (%) held by non-executives in pre-buyout 
target. 
Annual reports 
ROA Return on assets of (pre-buyout) target. Annual report 






Panel C: Second stage regression independent variables 
 
Variables Definition Source 
Dum_External Financing Dummy equals 1 if pre-buyout target raises external 
funds and 0 otherwise. 
SDC, Capital IQ, 
Zephyr, Venture 
Expert and offer 
documents. 
INVREC Sum of inventories and receivables, divided by total 
assets. 
DataStream 
NOA Net operating assets: Sum of shareholders’ equity minus 
cash and marketable securities and plus total debt, 
divided by total sales. 
DataStream 
Pred_Dum_MBO Predicted MBO obtained from first stage regression (of 
2SLS model). 
 
SPPE Total Fixed Assets or gross Property, Plant and 
Equipment (PPE) of pre-buyout target, divided by 
lagged total assets. 
DataStream and 
Annual reports 
YearCode Dummy variable equals 1 if buyout year is after the 
implementation of the revised Corporate Governance 







Table 2: Sample Description 
This table reports the distributions of UK buyouts by year (panel A) and by industry (panel B) over the period 
1997 (the start of the second MBO/LBO wave) to 2007 (when the MBO/LBO market severely declines 
following the financial crises). The industries are classified based on the Fama-French 10 industry classification. 
The financial services industry and the utilities’ sector are excluded. We further divide Fama-French’s “Others” 
category into the business service industry and construction industry, such that we end up with nine idustry 
categories. Sources: CMBOR, SDC, Venture Expert, Zephyr and Capital IQ.  
 
Panel A: Distribution of leveraged (management) buyouts over time 
 
Year Number Percent (%) 
1997 4 2.5 
1998 19 11.7 
1999 36 22.1 
2000 22 13.5 
2001 11 6.8 
2002 13 8.0 
2003 17 10.43 
2004 8 4.91 
2005 10 6.13 
2006 13 7.98 
2007 10 6.13 




Panel B: Distribution of leveraged buyouts across industries 
 
Industry Number Percent (%) 
Consumer NonDurables 17 10.4 
Consumer Durables 6 3.7 
Manufacturing 27 16.6 
High-Tech 22 13.5 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 42 25.8 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 4 2.5 
Business Services 36 22.1 
Construction 9 5.5 









Table 3: Accrual Management (Performance-Adjusted Modified-Jones Model) 
Raw abnormal accruals are measured by the differenc between actual total accruals and the estimated 
accruals from the expectation model. Panel A presents the expected accruals that are obtained from the 
following expectations model: 
i , t i , t i , t i , t
0 1 2 3 i ,t i , t
i , t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1
T A A C ( ∆ S a l e s - ∆ R e c e i v a b l e s ) P P E1
= β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β R O A + ε
A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TAAC is the total accruals defined as TACCi,t = EBXIi,t-OCFi,t, 
(Earnings before Extraordinary Items (EBXI) minus Cash Flow from Operating activities (OCF)). 
∆Salei,t stands for the change in Sales, ∆Receivablesi,t is the change in Receivables, and PPEi,t is the 
gross Property, Plant and Equipment. Assetsi,t-1 represents the book value of Total Assets. Performance 
is measured by ROAi,t. All variables (except ROA) are scaled by lagged total assets to mitigate 
heteroskedasticity in residuals. In panel B, the industry mean-adjusted abnormal accruals 
(Madj_ABN_TAACt-1) are calculated by subtracting the mean abnormal accru ls of the control 
observations in the same year and within the same two-digit SIC code from the raw abnormal accruals 
(RAW_ABN_TAACt-1). Industry-size mean adjusted abnormal accruals (MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1) are 
calculated by subtracting the mean abnormal accruals of the control observations falling in the same 
industry-size group from the raw abnormal accruals. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
All companies Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
β0 -35.43 30.21 765.49 -4389.51 2982.24 
t test (0.09) (0.13) (1.74) (8.58) (7.77) 
β1 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.33 0.42 
t test (0.67) (0.50) (1.94) (10.48) (8.33) 
β2 -0.09 -0.09 0.04 -0.22 0.03 
t test (4.01) (3.68) （2.30） (11.16) (0.64) 
β3 0.41 0.39 0.28 -0.38 1.13 
t test (3.38) (2.81) (2.97) (6.11) (14.92) 
Adj. R2 (%) 47.18 50.32 22.18 5.75 95.29 
 
 
Panel B. Performance-adjusted regression-based abnormal accruals 
 
Abnormal accruals Total MBO LBO Diff 
RAW_ABN_TAACt-1 -0.03
***  -0.03***  -0.02***  -0.01 
Madj_ABN_TAACt-1 -0.12
***  -0.14***  -0.07***  -0.07***  
MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 -0.12
***  -0.15***  -0.07***  -0.08***  










Table 4: Sales Manipulation 
The raw abnormal operating cash flows (RAW_ABN_OCFt-1) are measured by the difference between 
actual total operating cash flows and the estimated cash flows from an expectation model of which the 
results are presented in Panel A: 
i , t i , t i , t
0 1 2 3 i , t i , t
i , t - 1 i , t - 1 i , t - 1 i , t - 1
O C F S a l e s ∆ S a l e s1
= β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β R O A + ε
A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s  
In panel B, the industry-mean adjusted abnormal cash flows (Madj_ABN_OCFt-1) are calculated by 
subtracting the mean abnormal operating cash flows f the control observations (from the same year 
and within the same two-digit SIC code) from the raw bnormal cash flows. Industry-size mean 
adjusted abnormal cash flows (MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1) are obtained by subtracting the mean abnormal 
cash flows of the control observations falling in the same industry-size group from the raw abnormal 
cash flows. Matching-adjusted abnormal operating cash flows (ABN_OCFt-1) consist of the difference 
in abnormal operating cash flows between the sample buyouts and control firms (each target is 
matched with a non-buyout control company with the closest ROAi,t and with the same two-digit SIC 
code and for the same year). ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
All companies Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
β0 53.4 -80.22 1073.62 -4010.94 9049.37 
t test (0.17) (0.33) (1.60) (3.88) (4.29) 
β1 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.12 
t test (3.35) (2.79) (2.21) (0.25) (10.24) 
β2 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 -0.43 0.31 
t test (0.47) (0.36) (1.73) (6.58) (4.13) 
β3 0.61 0.62 0.28 -0.19 1.53 
t test (4.99) (3.77) (4.59) (0.66) (35.44) 
Adj. R2 (%) 73.17 76.31 17.98 4.82 97.92 
 
 
Panel B. Abnormal operating cash flows 
 
Abnormal operating CF Total MBO LBO Diff  
RAW_ABN_OCFt-1 0.03
***  0.03**  0.02**  0.01 
Madj_ABN_OCFt-1 0.02
***  0.02***  0.02* 0.00 
MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 0.02
***  0.02***  0.01 0.01 
ABN_OCFt-1 0.02
***  0.03***  0.01 0.02 








Table 5: Production Manipulation 
The raw abnormal production costs (RAW_ABN_PRODt-1) are measured by the difference between 
actual total production costs and the estimated prouction costs from an expectation model of which 
the results are presented in panel A: 
i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t - 1
0 1 2 3 4 i ,t i ,t
i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1 i ,t - 1
P R O D S a le s ∆ S a le s ∆ S a le s1
= β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β [ ] + β R O A + ε
A ss e ts A s s e ts A s s e ts A s s e ts A s s e ts
In Panel B, the Industry-mean adjusted abnormal production costs (Madj_ABN_PRODt-1) are 
calculated by subtracting the mean abnormal production costs of the control firms (within the same 
two-digit SIC code and of the same year) from the raw abnormal production costs. The industry-size 
mean adjusted abnormal production costs (MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1) are calculated by subtracting the 
mean abnormal production costs of the control firms (falling in the same industry-size group as the 
target firms) from the raw abnormal production costs of the target buyouts. The matching-adjusted 
abnormal production costs (ABN_PRODt-1) consist of the difference in abnormal production costs 
between the sample firms and the control firms. We match each target buyout with a non-buyout 
control company with the closest ROAi,t and in the same two-digit SIC code and year. ***, ** and * 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
  
 Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
All companies Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
β0 -2373.5 -1419.8 5900.4 -49035 10780.9 
t test (1.97) (1.67) (2.28) (9.89) (2.91) 
β1 0.75 0.75 0.11 0.39 0.99 
t test (18.62) (16.48) (12.24) (2.23) (88.56) 
β2 0.1 0.1 0.41 -1.27 3.34 
t test (0.67) (0.68) (1.64) (4.09) (4.75) 
β3 -0.08 0.00 0.38 -1.82 0.51 
t test (0.18) (0.08) (1.58) (4.93) (4.05) 
β4 -0.52 -0.53 0.64 -2.14 2.99 
t test (1.28) (1.15) (1.47) (8.14) (2.10) 
Adj. R2 (%) 96.61 97.47 2.42 89.73 99.87 
 
 
Panel B. Abnormal production costs 
 
Abnormal production costs Total MBO LBO Diff 
RAW_ABN_PRODt-1 -0.06
**  -0.07**  -0.04 -0.03 
Madj_ABN_PRODt-1 -0.03
* -0.04**  0.01 -0.02 
MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1 -0.03 -0.04
* 0.00 -0.03 
ABN_PRODt-1 -0.06 -0.06
* -0.02 -0.04 
















Table 6: Correlation Matrix for Earnings Management Proxies 
We present the Pearson correlation matrix between accru l and real earnings management proxies. 
MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 is industry-size mean adjusted abnormal accruals (obtained by subtracting the 
mean abnormal accruals of the control firms of similar size (in the same year) and within the same 
two-digit SIC code) from the raw abnormal accruals. MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 is the industry-size mean 
adjusted abnormal operating cash flows. MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1 is the industry-size mean adjusted 
abnormal production costs. Panel A shows the matrix based on all buyouts. Panel B (C) shows the 
matrix for MBOs (LBOs). ***, ** and * stand for staistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Correlation matrix for all buyouts 
 
All LBOs (163) MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1 
MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 1   
MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 -0.49






Panel B. Correlation matrix for all MBO 
 
MBOs (108) MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1 
MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 1 
  
MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 -0.53***  1 
 
MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1 -0.06 -0.18* 1 
 
 
Panel C. Correlation matrix for all LBOs 
 
LBOs (55) MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1 
MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 1   
MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 -0.42
**  1  




















Table 7: Asset Revaluation  
The raw abnormal asset revaluation (RAW_ABN_REVALUEt-1) in the manipulation year is measured as 
the change in asset revaluation reserves scaled by current total assets. We then subtract the industry 
average of the revaluation amount from the raw asset revaluation in order to obtain the industry 
mean-adjusted abnormal revaluation (Madj_ABN_REVALUEt-1). Industry-size mean adjusted abnormal 
asset revaluation (MadjSize_ABN_REVALUEt-1) is calculated by subtracting the mean asset revaluation 
of the control firms (falling in the same industry-size group) from the raw asset revaluation. 
ROA-matched asset revaluation (ABN_REVALUEt-1) is measured as the difference in asset revaluation 
between sample and control firms. The control firms are non-buyout companies with the same 
two-digit SIC code and the ROAi,t (considered in the same year as the sample firm) that is closest to the 
buyout target. In Panel B, “No change” signifies that the asset revaluation reserves remain the same in 
both the manipulation year and one year before. “Upward revaluation” indicates that there is an 
increase in revaluation activities from one year before the manipulation year to the next, while 
“Downward revaluation” captures the opposite case. “Transfer” reflects that the change in revaluation 
reserves are arising from transferring in or transferring out between revaluation reserves account and 
other reserves accounts. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Abnormal revaluation 
 
Abnormal revaluation Total MBO LBO Diff 
RAW_ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.001 -0.001 0.006
**  -0.007**  
Madj_ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.002 -0.000 0.008
**  -0.008* 
MadjSize_ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.004
* 0.001 0.010* -0.009 
ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.005
**  0.004 0.010* -0.006 




Panel B. Detailed information on the asset revaluation reserves 
 
Abnormal revaluation Total MBO LBO 
No change (%) 69.28 70.30 67.31 
Upward revaluation (%) 20.26 3.96 5.77 
Downward revaluation (%) 4.58 3.96 9.62 
Transfer (%) 5.88 21.78 17.31 



















Table 8: Earnings manipulation by subperiod 
This table assesses the impact of the enactment of the revised UK Coporate Governance Code of 2003 
on the reduction of accounting manipulation. We divide the sample period into two subperiods: 
1997-2003 and 2004-2007. Abnormal accruals, abnormal operation cash flows (OCF), abnormal 
production costs (PROD), abnormal assets revaluations are calculated similarly as in table 3, 4, 5 and 7, 
with variables lagged by two years. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level. 
 
Panel A. Abnormal accruals 
 
Abnormal accruals Total 1997-2003 2004-2007 Diff 
RAW_ABN_TAACt-1 -0.03
**  -0.03** * -0.03** * 0.00 
Madj_ABN_TAACt-1 -0.12
***  -0.14***  -0.04**  -0.11***  
MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1 -0.12
***  -0.15***  -0.02 -0.14***  
ABN_TAAC t-1 -0.06
***  -0.08***  -0.00 -0.07***  




Panel B. Abnormal operating cash flows 
 
Abnormal operating CF Total 1997-2003 2004-2007 Diff  
RAW_ABN_OCFt-1 0.03
***  0.02**  0.04**  -0.02 
Madj_ABN_OCFt-1 0.02
***  0.01**  0.03**  -0.02 
MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1 0.02
***  0.02**  0.03**  -0.02 
ABN_OCFt-1 0.02
***  0.02**  0.01 0.01 
Nr. of observations 163 122 41 
  
 
Panel C. Abnormal production costs 
 
Abnormal production costs Total 1997-2003 2004-2007 Diff 
RAW_ABN_PRODt-1 -0.06
**  -0.02 -0.14**  -0.11**  
Madj_ABN_PRODt-1 -0.03
* -0.00 -0.10**  -0.09**  
MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1 -0.03 -0.00 -0.09
**  -0.08**  
ABN_PRODt-1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
* 0.00 




Panel D. Abnormal revaluation 
 
Abnormal revaluation Total 1997-2003 2004-2007 Diff 
RAW_ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.001 -0.001
** * 0.007**  -0.008* 
Madj_ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.002 -0.001 0.011
** -0.012** 
MadjSize_ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.004
* -0.001 0.019** -0.020**  
ABN_REVALUEt-1 0.005
**  0.003 0.014* -0.013* 










Table 9: Analysis of the Incentives Affecting Earnings Manipulation  
(2SLS approach) 
The first stage dependent variable is Dum_MBO, which indicates whether the buyout is a MBO 
(Dum_MBO=1) or a LBO (Dum_MBO=0). The IVs are Management Own (equity share owned by 
managers in pre-buyout target), Non-Executive Own (equity share held by non-executive directors) and 
Size (log. of total assets). The second stage dependent variable is Industry-size mean adjusted 
abnormal accruals (MadjSize_ABN_TAACt-1) /operating cash flow (MadjSize_ABN_OCFt-1) 
/production costs (MadjSize_ABN_PRODt-1). Pred_Dum_MBO, is the predicted type of buyouts (from 
stage 1). Dum_ External Financing equals one when targets raise external funds during the buyouts. 
SPPE is the property, plant and equipment (PPE) scaled by total assets. For accrual management, the 
internal manipulation capacity is captured by the net operating assets (NOA) position (sum of equity 
minus cash and marketable securities, plus total debt, standardized by total sales). The level of the 
stock of inventories and receivables (INVREC) captures the flexibility of managers to manipulate real 
activities. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: First stage: The Buyout Type 
 
Dep.Var. Dum_MBO Model 1: First stage 
Management Own i, t-2 0.506
***  
(0.189) 
Non-Executive Own i, t-2 -0.937
***  
(0.356) 
Size i, t-2 -0.105
***  
(0.029) 
Year Fixed effects Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.192 
Tests of endogeneity (p value) 0.004 
Test of overidentifying restrictions  (p value) 0.255 
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Table 10: Robustness tests on the determinants of earnings manipulation 
This table provides the robustness tests for second stage regressions of Panel B, Table 9. The dependent variable in Model (1) is ROA matched abnormal accruals (ABN_TAACt-1). The 
dependent variable in Model (2) is raw adjusted abnormal operating cash flows (RAW_ABN_OCFt-1). For definitions of the other dependent and independent variables, see Table 1. 
Model (4) conducts the second stage by means of a GMM approach. Models (5) and (6) further investigates the change i  accrual management behavior after the enactment of the 
revised UK Corporate Governance Code (Code) in 2003. The first stage IVs are Management Own, Non-Executive Own and Size. Pred_Dum_MBO, is the predicted type of buyouts. 
YearCode equals one if the buyout took place after 2003, zero otherwise. The other variables are the same as in Table 9. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance atthe 1%, 5% and 
10% level. 
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Year Fixed effects 
Industry Fixed effects 
Observations 
Yes 
Yes 
158 
Yes 
Yes 
158 
Yes 
Yes 
158 
Yes 
Yes 
158 
Yes 
Yes 
158 
Yes 
Yes 
158 
 
